Product details

By continuing to use our site you consent to the use of cookies as described in our privacy policy unless you have disabled them.
You can change your cookie settings at any time but parts of our site will not function correctly without them.
Published by: Stanford Business School
Originally published in: 1995
Version: March 1995
Length: 23 pages
Data source: Published sources

Abstract

Lloyd's of London was a unique institution: an insurance market of competing syndicates in which syndicate managers simultaneously wrote insurance policies and acted as the fiduciary agents of outside investors who provided their underwriting capital. A market leader for 300 years, Lloyd's engendered innovation and expertise. Faced with declining market share in the 1980s and an influx of new investors, several syndicates have led to charges of fraud and incompetence. The case is useful for illustrating moral hazard, adverse selection, reputational and repeated game equilibriums. It is also useful for illustrating the advantages and disadvantages of market transaction in comparison to transactions within the firm.
Location:
Industry:
Other setting(s):
1995

About

Abstract

Lloyd's of London was a unique institution: an insurance market of competing syndicates in which syndicate managers simultaneously wrote insurance policies and acted as the fiduciary agents of outside investors who provided their underwriting capital. A market leader for 300 years, Lloyd's engendered innovation and expertise. Faced with declining market share in the 1980s and an influx of new investors, several syndicates have led to charges of fraud and incompetence. The case is useful for illustrating moral hazard, adverse selection, reputational and repeated game equilibriums. It is also useful for illustrating the advantages and disadvantages of market transaction in comparison to transactions within the firm.

Settings

Location:
Industry:
Other setting(s):
1995

Related