Product details

By continuing to use our site you consent to the use of cookies as described in our privacy policy unless you have disabled them.
You can change your cookie settings at any time but parts of our site will not function correctly without them.

Abstract

'Intel's Mobile Strategy in 2015 and Beyond' examines the company’s 2014 - 2015 strategy to become a more important mobile player. In early 2015, the semiconductor giant had virtually no presence in the smartphone market, and had only recently gained a real presence in the tablet market. Getting into the mobile market was strategically vital for Intel as the notebook market had been shrinking due to cannibalisation from tablets. Flattening demand for notebook processors also meant that production volume in Intel’s multi-billion fabrication plants was flattening as well. Intel’s mobile efforts had led to losses of $5 billion by the first quarter of 2015. Most phones and tablets ran on a competing architecture designed and licensed by ARM Holdings, and Intel competitors Qualcomm, Apple, Samsung and MediaTek made most of the processors for mobile devices. Intel’s efforts to gain market share included compensating its manufacturing customers for the cost of using Intel’s more expensive chips. Its goal was to supply chips for 40 million tablets by the end of 2014 (which it exceeded). Intel was also engaging in new partnerships and investment tactics in China to sell Intel-branded chips for the low end of the tablet market. In pursuing the mobile market, Intel had encountered technology challenges and delays, as well as an internal resistance to selling the lower-priced, lower-margin mobile processors, despite having data showing customers’ increasing desire for mobile products. Intel had very little time to establish a relevant presence in the mobile market, and the question was whether implementing these new strategies would be enough.

About

Abstract

'Intel's Mobile Strategy in 2015 and Beyond' examines the company’s 2014 - 2015 strategy to become a more important mobile player. In early 2015, the semiconductor giant had virtually no presence in the smartphone market, and had only recently gained a real presence in the tablet market. Getting into the mobile market was strategically vital for Intel as the notebook market had been shrinking due to cannibalisation from tablets. Flattening demand for notebook processors also meant that production volume in Intel’s multi-billion fabrication plants was flattening as well. Intel’s mobile efforts had led to losses of $5 billion by the first quarter of 2015. Most phones and tablets ran on a competing architecture designed and licensed by ARM Holdings, and Intel competitors Qualcomm, Apple, Samsung and MediaTek made most of the processors for mobile devices. Intel’s efforts to gain market share included compensating its manufacturing customers for the cost of using Intel’s more expensive chips. Its goal was to supply chips for 40 million tablets by the end of 2014 (which it exceeded). Intel was also engaging in new partnerships and investment tactics in China to sell Intel-branded chips for the low end of the tablet market. In pursuing the mobile market, Intel had encountered technology challenges and delays, as well as an internal resistance to selling the lower-priced, lower-margin mobile processors, despite having data showing customers’ increasing desire for mobile products. Intel had very little time to establish a relevant presence in the mobile market, and the question was whether implementing these new strategies would be enough.

Settings


Related