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Published by: Ivey Publishing
Originally published in: 2018
Version: 2018-09-28

Abstract

In January 2018, the governor of the Bank of Japan (BoJ), was preparing for a meeting of the policy board of the BoJ. While the broad macroeconomic indicators hinted at a Japanese recovery, Japan still continued to have an inflation rate well below its target of 2 per cent. The accommodative, unconventional monetary policy of quantitative and qualitative easing engineered by the governor in 2013 had resulted in a bloated balance sheet for the BoJ, with little success in overcoming deflation. Was it time to wind up Japan's monetary stimulus? What would be the results of continued monetary stimulus, especially for businesses? Would the Japanese economy be able to recover from deflation without such monetary stimulus?
Location:
Other setting(s):
2018

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Abstract

In January 2018, the governor of the Bank of Japan (BoJ), was preparing for a meeting of the policy board of the BoJ. While the broad macroeconomic indicators hinted at a Japanese recovery, Japan still continued to have an inflation rate well below its target of 2 per cent. The accommodative, unconventional monetary policy of quantitative and qualitative easing engineered by the governor in 2013 had resulted in a bloated balance sheet for the BoJ, with little success in overcoming deflation. Was it time to wind up Japan's monetary stimulus? What would be the results of continued monetary stimulus, especially for businesses? Would the Japanese economy be able to recover from deflation without such monetary stimulus?

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Location:
Other setting(s):
2018

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