Subject category:
Finance, Accounting and Control
Published by:
Harvard Business Publishing
Version: 20 May 2001
Length: 17 pages
Data source: Published sources
Abstract
Eight days after CSX announced it was going to buy Consolidated Rail (Conrail) for USD88.65 per share, Norfolk Southern made a hostile USD100 per share bid for Conrail. Over the next several months, the potential acquirers upped their bids while exchanging criticism in the popular press, prompting analysts to call this one of the nastiest takeover battles of the 1990s. The case is set in January 1997, just before Conrail shareholders are scheduled to vote on the proposed deal with CSX. It analyzes the trend toward consolidation in the US railroad industry, the bidding war for Conrail, and the various provisions in Pennsylvania's anti-takeover laws, which restrict the market for corporate control. It also explores the strategic and financial implications of a bidding war and challenges the assumption that failure to acquire is a zero net present value endeavor. Finally, it examines the nature of and economic basis for regulating the market for corporate control.
Location:
Industry:
Size:
USD19 billion revenues, 77,500 employees
Other setting(s):
1996-1997
About
Abstract
Eight days after CSX announced it was going to buy Consolidated Rail (Conrail) for USD88.65 per share, Norfolk Southern made a hostile USD100 per share bid for Conrail. Over the next several months, the potential acquirers upped their bids while exchanging criticism in the popular press, prompting analysts to call this one of the nastiest takeover battles of the 1990s. The case is set in January 1997, just before Conrail shareholders are scheduled to vote on the proposed deal with CSX. It analyzes the trend toward consolidation in the US railroad industry, the bidding war for Conrail, and the various provisions in Pennsylvania's anti-takeover laws, which restrict the market for corporate control. It also explores the strategic and financial implications of a bidding war and challenges the assumption that failure to acquire is a zero net present value endeavor. Finally, it examines the nature of and economic basis for regulating the market for corporate control.
Settings
Location:
Industry:
Size:
USD19 billion revenues, 77,500 employees
Other setting(s):
1996-1997