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Compact case
Case
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Reference no. 9-795-121
Published by: Harvard Business Publishing
Published in: 1995
Length: 1 pages
Data source: Published sources

Abstract

Companies sometimes issue rebate coupons entitling the holder to a certain amount off the price of their products. This case explores the effects of rebate coupons on the game between two companies that operate in a market where there is very little underlying customer loyalty.; Can be used to examine how, by issuing rebate coupons, sellers can make money even when each has zero added value. Analysis indicates that all sellers gain, even if only one seller issues rebates. When all sellers issue rebates, all sellers gain more. The effect is seen to depend on the presence of an underlying rule of the marketplace ("one-price-to-all").

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Abstract

Companies sometimes issue rebate coupons entitling the holder to a certain amount off the price of their products. This case explores the effects of rebate coupons on the game between two companies that operate in a market where there is very little underlying customer loyalty.; Can be used to examine how, by issuing rebate coupons, sellers can make money even when each has zero added value. Analysis indicates that all sellers gain, even if only one seller issues rebates. When all sellers issue rebates, all sellers gain more. The effect is seen to depend on the presence of an underlying rule of the marketplace ("one-price-to-all").

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