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Management article
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Reference no. 91407
Published by: Harvard Business Publishing
Published in: "Harvard Business Review", 1991

Abstract

The virtual demise of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts has not cooled the tensions over corporate governance. The basic issues remain remarkably consistent. When do investors'' legimate needs for returns translate into destructive pressures on long-term prosperity? What is the role of the board of directors as a management monitor and shareholder representative? A working group of lawyers representing large public companies and leading institutional investors has developed a set of principles that reconciles the tensions between owners and managers. The resulting statement is printed in this article.

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Abstract

The virtual demise of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts has not cooled the tensions over corporate governance. The basic issues remain remarkably consistent. When do investors'' legimate needs for returns translate into destructive pressures on long-term prosperity? What is the role of the board of directors as a management monitor and shareholder representative? A working group of lawyers representing large public companies and leading institutional investors has developed a set of principles that reconciles the tensions between owners and managers. The resulting statement is printed in this article.

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