Nordstrom: Dissension in the Ranks? (A)

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Case

Reference no. 9-191-002

Subject category: Human Resource Management / Organisational Behaviour

Authors: Robert L Simons (Harvard Business School); Hilary A Weston (Harvard Business School)

Published by: Harvard Business Publishing

Originally published in: 1990

Version: 15 October 1999

Length: 24 pages

Data source: Published sources

Topics: Compensation and benefits; Employee behavior; Employee performance management; Employee satisfaction; Managing people; Organizational culture

Share a link: https://casecent.re/p/62493

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Abstract

In 1989, the performance measurement systems and compensation policies of Nordstrom Department Stores unexpectedly came under attack by employees, unions, and government regulators. The case describes the 'sales-per-hour' monitoring and compensation system that many believed to be instrumental in Nordstrom's phenomenal success. Illustrates how rapid company growth, decentralized management, and unrelenting pressure to perform can distort performance measurement systems and lead to undesirable consequences. This product can be used with the free Job Design Optimization Tool (JDOT), available at: hbsp.harvard.edu/jdot

Location:

United States

Industries:

Retail trade; Electricity, gas, water & wastewater

Other setting(s):

1989