Published by:
MIT Sloan School of Management
Length: 3 pages
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Abstract
The longer the United States, other industrialized nations and the developing world head down different policy tracks on global warming, the harder it will be to achieve the coordination necessary for effective action. Before September 11, the Bush administration was often criticized for going it alone in foreign relations, notably in its decisions to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to reject the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Since September 11, while the United States has built a broad coalition against terrorism and is talking seriously to Russia about the ABM treaty, it is still quite alone in its stance on climate. The result is that industrialized nations can ratify the Kyoto Protocol, pleasing their green voters and making a claim to environmental leadership, without imposing noticeable costs on domestic businesses or consumers. Even if the Bush administration might like to negotiate its way back into a similarly sweet deal, it cannot now do so gracefully, after having so publicly and loudly rejected the whole process. Thus it seems likely that most industrial nations will impose very weak controls on the emissions of CO2 (and other greenhouse gases) by the end of this decade, while the Bush administration either will do nothing to reduce emissions or will offer modest proposals intended mainly to reduce criticism from environmentalists. (If the US environmental community holds out for expensive measures, nothing at all will happen.) And the developing world will mainly watch from the sidelines. This outcome will complicate any serious attempt to slow climate change, which will require global participation and tight policy coordination. The longer the United States, other industrialized nations and the developing world head down different policy tracks, the harder the necessary participation and coordination will be to achieve. On the other hand, Kyoto represents only the first of what will likely be many rounds of international negotiations on this issue, and there is time to undo its unfortunate effects.
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Abstract
The longer the United States, other industrialized nations and the developing world head down different policy tracks on global warming, the harder it will be to achieve the coordination necessary for effective action. Before September 11, the Bush administration was often criticized for going it alone in foreign relations, notably in its decisions to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and to reject the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Since September 11, while the United States has built a broad coalition against terrorism and is talking seriously to Russia about the ABM treaty, it is still quite alone in its stance on climate. The result is that industrialized nations can ratify the Kyoto Protocol, pleasing their green voters and making a claim to environmental leadership, without imposing noticeable costs on domestic businesses or consumers. Even if the Bush administration might like to negotiate its way back into a similarly sweet deal, it cannot now do so gracefully, after having so publicly and loudly rejected the whole process. Thus it seems likely that most industrial nations will impose very weak controls on the emissions of CO2 (and other greenhouse gases) by the end of this decade, while the Bush administration either will do nothing to reduce emissions or will offer modest proposals intended mainly to reduce criticism from environmentalists. (If the US environmental community holds out for expensive measures, nothing at all will happen.) And the developing world will mainly watch from the sidelines. This outcome will complicate any serious attempt to slow climate change, which will require global participation and tight policy coordination. The longer the United States, other industrialized nations and the developing world head down different policy tracks, the harder the necessary participation and coordination will be to achieve. On the other hand, Kyoto represents only the first of what will likely be many rounds of international negotiations on this issue, and there is time to undo its unfortunate effects.