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This case tells the story of American policy toward Iraq up to the moment of Iraq''s invasion of Kuwait. Based on declassified government documents as well as repeated in-depth interviews with top policymakers at the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA, the case is a portrait of a relatively "typical" bilateral policy, with limited objectives and limited prospects, buffeted by bureaucratic pressures and external events. Unlike case studies of major crises, this case offers a more representative study of the real dilemmas in day-to- day policymaking at the subcabinet level of the government, spotlighted by the fact that this narrative ends with the outbreak of a war. A host of issues are illuminated, from how the US tries to assess the conduct of other governments to a fundamental but difficult choice: In dealing with potential adversaries, when should we choose engagement and when should we choose confrontation? And do these choices matter?