Subject category:
Strategy and General Management
Published in:
2006
Length: 22 pages
Data source: Field research
Abstract
When the state of Ford's two Mexican assembly plants was examined, vast differences between the two during the early 1990s were revealed. The Hermosillo plant (HSAP) in the northern state of Sonora was conceived as a lean high-tech assembly operation that rivalled many of the best manufacturing plants in the world. Its products were intended to satisfy demand in markets outside of Mexico, chiefly in the United States. By 1994, HSAP was producing nearly 150,000 vehicles, comprising roughly 13% of Ford's vehicle production. During this time, HSAP emerged as a star performer and was valued for transferring learning - primarily in the form of technology and work-organisation innovations - to other plants. At the same time, however, Cuautitlan (CAP) seemed to be left out of this learning process. The Cuautitlan plant near Mexico City was an older production facility with less sophisticated machinery and automation. Its products were originally planned for a small domestic Mexican market with some eventual exports. Additionally, CAP had a greater number of workers and was modelled after the 'escalafon' system, the traditional pay and promotion system used by many manufacturing firms in Mexico. By 1994, CAP was contributing nearly 93,000 units to Ford's vehicle production, which comprised roughly 8% of the company's total. This plant differed in its learning transfer involvement. This case explores the changes that Ford made to its Mexican assembly operations from the early 1990s to the present and seeks to answer to answer some key questions. The interactions between Ford Hermosillo and Ford Cuautitlan are the primary issues addressed in the ensuing material. Additionally, the looming strategic questions now facing each plant will be examined. This case was sponsored by the Indiana University CIBER Case Collection.
About
Abstract
When the state of Ford's two Mexican assembly plants was examined, vast differences between the two during the early 1990s were revealed. The Hermosillo plant (HSAP) in the northern state of Sonora was conceived as a lean high-tech assembly operation that rivalled many of the best manufacturing plants in the world. Its products were intended to satisfy demand in markets outside of Mexico, chiefly in the United States. By 1994, HSAP was producing nearly 150,000 vehicles, comprising roughly 13% of Ford's vehicle production. During this time, HSAP emerged as a star performer and was valued for transferring learning - primarily in the form of technology and work-organisation innovations - to other plants. At the same time, however, Cuautitlan (CAP) seemed to be left out of this learning process. The Cuautitlan plant near Mexico City was an older production facility with less sophisticated machinery and automation. Its products were originally planned for a small domestic Mexican market with some eventual exports. Additionally, CAP had a greater number of workers and was modelled after the 'escalafon' system, the traditional pay and promotion system used by many manufacturing firms in Mexico. By 1994, CAP was contributing nearly 93,000 units to Ford's vehicle production, which comprised roughly 8% of the company's total. This plant differed in its learning transfer involvement. This case explores the changes that Ford made to its Mexican assembly operations from the early 1990s to the present and seeks to answer to answer some key questions. The interactions between Ford Hermosillo and Ford Cuautitlan are the primary issues addressed in the ensuing material. Additionally, the looming strategic questions now facing each plant will be examined. This case was sponsored by the Indiana University CIBER Case Collection.