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Published by: Harvard Kennedy School
Published in: 1992
Length: 7 pages

Abstract

This is a blow-by-blow account, painstakingly assembled from objective sources on the public record, of the dramatic effort of Soviet conservatives to seize power in August 1991, through the means of a coup d''etat. On one level, the case provides both a succinct, historical account of events, useful for those with a special interest in the last days of the Soviet Union. More broadly, however, it provides a narrative which can illuminate the political tensions which arise in periods of crisis and the form which those tensions are likely to take. It may be that the last days of the Soviet Union, like the memorable events of France in 1789, will serve both as history and as metaphor. This trenchant account is a digest for those who would use the 1991 coup to examine the typology of political forces in a rapidly changing society. An appendix examines the power of non-violent action-as symbolized by the Boris Yeltsin resistance to the coup-as a potent persuasive tactic.

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Abstract

This is a blow-by-blow account, painstakingly assembled from objective sources on the public record, of the dramatic effort of Soviet conservatives to seize power in August 1991, through the means of a coup d''etat. On one level, the case provides both a succinct, historical account of events, useful for those with a special interest in the last days of the Soviet Union. More broadly, however, it provides a narrative which can illuminate the political tensions which arise in periods of crisis and the form which those tensions are likely to take. It may be that the last days of the Soviet Union, like the memorable events of France in 1789, will serve both as history and as metaphor. This trenchant account is a digest for those who would use the 1991 coup to examine the typology of political forces in a rapidly changing society. An appendix examines the power of non-violent action-as symbolized by the Boris Yeltsin resistance to the coup-as a potent persuasive tactic.

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