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Abstract

When the Bush administration considers ways in which to make good on its pledge to win the war against drugs, it turns to a new type of law enforcement agency. The Financial Crime Enforcement Network, a division of the Treasury Department created in early 1990, is designed to use information from a wide variety of government agencies to follow the money-laundering trail left by drug kingpins. But an agency which must depend for its lifeblood on information in the files of other agencies faces a daunting challenge. Even the anti-drug mission is no guarantee of cooperation. This case examines the incentives and disincentives for federal inter-agency cooperation.

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Abstract

When the Bush administration considers ways in which to make good on its pledge to win the war against drugs, it turns to a new type of law enforcement agency. The Financial Crime Enforcement Network, a division of the Treasury Department created in early 1990, is designed to use information from a wide variety of government agencies to follow the money-laundering trail left by drug kingpins. But an agency which must depend for its lifeblood on information in the files of other agencies faces a daunting challenge. Even the anti-drug mission is no guarantee of cooperation. This case examines the incentives and disincentives for federal inter-agency cooperation.

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