Subject category:
Ethics and Social Responsibility
Published by:
Harvard Kennedy School
Length: 11 pages
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https://casecent.re/p/7462
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Abstract
The Reagan administration decision to impose economic sanctions designed to halt construction of a Soviet gas pipeline built to supply Western Europe led, starting in late 1981, to a serious split among the NATO allies. The administration''s emphasis on constraining the Soviet economy-particularly the sale of natural resources for hard currency-as a means of limiting Soviet military build-up, conflicted with the European desire for an inexpensive, reliable energy supply. This case follows the course of the pipeline sanctions dispute with particular emphasis on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. It invites discussion of the relationship between analysis and political decision-making; in this case, analysis of whether or not the CIA, which came to believe strongly that sanctions could not halt construction of the pipeline, was an effective force in internal US debate.
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Abstract
The Reagan administration decision to impose economic sanctions designed to halt construction of a Soviet gas pipeline built to supply Western Europe led, starting in late 1981, to a serious split among the NATO allies. The administration''s emphasis on constraining the Soviet economy-particularly the sale of natural resources for hard currency-as a means of limiting Soviet military build-up, conflicted with the European desire for an inexpensive, reliable energy supply. This case follows the course of the pipeline sanctions dispute with particular emphasis on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. It invites discussion of the relationship between analysis and political decision-making; in this case, analysis of whether or not the CIA, which came to believe strongly that sanctions could not halt construction of the pipeline, was an effective force in internal US debate.