Product details

By continuing to use our site you consent to the use of cookies as described in our privacy policy unless you have disabled them.
You can change your cookie settings at any time but parts of our site will not function correctly without them.
Case
-
Reference no. HKS0859.0
Published by: Harvard Kennedy School
Published in: 1988
Length: 19 pages
Notes: For terms & conditions go to www.thecasecentre.org/freecaseterms

Abstract

The 1982 terrorist bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon, and the deaths of more than 240 Marines, dramatically demonstrated the failure of US policy to keep the peace amidst the Lebanese civil war. But CIA analysts had warned long before that military intervention in Lebanon would not serve US ends. Why weren't their warnings heeded - or their advice regularly sought? How does intelligence analysis fit in the structure of American foreign policy formation?

About

Abstract

The 1982 terrorist bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon, and the deaths of more than 240 Marines, dramatically demonstrated the failure of US policy to keep the peace amidst the Lebanese civil war. But CIA analysts had warned long before that military intervention in Lebanon would not serve US ends. Why weren't their warnings heeded - or their advice regularly sought? How does intelligence analysis fit in the structure of American foreign policy formation?

Related