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Published by: Harvard Kennedy School
Published in: 1990
Length: 26 pages

Abstract

These cases explore the other side of the privatization debate: Can latitude in 'contracting out' for services go too far? When one of the navy's major procurement agencies comes under pressure for its use of consultants, it must assess not only which of its functions are properly done by its own staff but examine the incentive structure which leads public employees to prefer to contract out a variety of services. Among the findings: public employees may rate greater deference and perks when they control and distribute contracts than when they do the work themselves.

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Abstract

These cases explore the other side of the privatization debate: Can latitude in 'contracting out' for services go too far? When one of the navy's major procurement agencies comes under pressure for its use of consultants, it must assess not only which of its functions are properly done by its own staff but examine the incentive structure which leads public employees to prefer to contract out a variety of services. Among the findings: public employees may rate greater deference and perks when they control and distribute contracts than when they do the work themselves.

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