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Case
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Reference no. 704-043-1
Published by: INSEAD
Originally published in: 2004
Version: 06.2004

Abstract

This is the first of a two-case series (704-043-1 and 704-044-1). This (A) case describes how Guy Wyser-Pratte, a pro-active investor and corporate governance advocate, puts pressure on Royal Vendex KBB, the leading non-food retailer in the Netherlands, to alter its corporate governance system. In an impassioned speech at the 2002 annual meeting of shareholders, he challenges Vendex Supervisory Director, Harry Langman, to discard the companys'' dysfunctional corporate governance system by dismantling its anti-takeover structure, and granting more voting rights to its shareholders. How will the board react and what will be the next step of Wyser-Pratte? The purpose of this case is to allow a discussion on shareholder power and the response of the supervisory board in ''Rhenan capitalism'' countries to this increased shareholder activism. Students can thereby discuss if they believe the motives/arguments of active investors in increasing shareholder value. Or do active investors merely look for short-term gains and a quick exit from their investment?
Location:
Industry:
Size:
45,000 employees, net sales EUR4.5 billion in 2002
Other setting(s):
2002-2003

About

Abstract

This is the first of a two-case series (704-043-1 and 704-044-1). This (A) case describes how Guy Wyser-Pratte, a pro-active investor and corporate governance advocate, puts pressure on Royal Vendex KBB, the leading non-food retailer in the Netherlands, to alter its corporate governance system. In an impassioned speech at the 2002 annual meeting of shareholders, he challenges Vendex Supervisory Director, Harry Langman, to discard the companys'' dysfunctional corporate governance system by dismantling its anti-takeover structure, and granting more voting rights to its shareholders. How will the board react and what will be the next step of Wyser-Pratte? The purpose of this case is to allow a discussion on shareholder power and the response of the supervisory board in ''Rhenan capitalism'' countries to this increased shareholder activism. Students can thereby discuss if they believe the motives/arguments of active investors in increasing shareholder value. Or do active investors merely look for short-term gains and a quick exit from their investment?

Settings

Location:
Industry:
Size:
45,000 employees, net sales EUR4.5 billion in 2002
Other setting(s):
2002-2003

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