Subject category:
Strategy and General Management
Published by:
Stanford Business School
Version: 23 June 2005
Length: 19 pages
Data source: Field research
Abstract
In October 1998, VERITAS and Seagate''s Network Storage and Management Group, which both sold data storage management software, agreed to merge. In terms of employee size and revenues, it was nearly a merger of equals. Until regulatory approval for the merger was granted from the government under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, the two companies could share only public information, initially limiting due diligence. The companies received HSR approval on 4 December 1998. It had been clear from public information that the two companies offered different products, sold through different channels of distribution, and captured two different customer segments of the market. After all, these differences were regarded as complements and the major justification behind the merger. However, what was not so apparent until HSR approval was the clash in sales force cultures. Paul Sallaberry, an Executive at pre-merger VERITAS, assumed the role of Executive Vice-president of worldwide sales and marketing after the merger. Sallaberry needed to design a sales force integration plan that would take the company to billions of dollars in sales within the next few years without sacrificing any short-term sales momentum. To do so, he had to resolve the issues at hand: (1) culture clashes; (2) disparate compensation structures; (3) overlapping territories; and (4) redundant management positions.
Industry:
Size:
2,000 employees, $400 million revenues
Other setting(s):
1999
About
Abstract
In October 1998, VERITAS and Seagate''s Network Storage and Management Group, which both sold data storage management software, agreed to merge. In terms of employee size and revenues, it was nearly a merger of equals. Until regulatory approval for the merger was granted from the government under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, the two companies could share only public information, initially limiting due diligence. The companies received HSR approval on 4 December 1998. It had been clear from public information that the two companies offered different products, sold through different channels of distribution, and captured two different customer segments of the market. After all, these differences were regarded as complements and the major justification behind the merger. However, what was not so apparent until HSR approval was the clash in sales force cultures. Paul Sallaberry, an Executive at pre-merger VERITAS, assumed the role of Executive Vice-president of worldwide sales and marketing after the merger. Sallaberry needed to design a sales force integration plan that would take the company to billions of dollars in sales within the next few years without sacrificing any short-term sales momentum. To do so, he had to resolve the issues at hand: (1) culture clashes; (2) disparate compensation structures; (3) overlapping territories; and (4) redundant management positions.
Settings
Industry:
Size:
2,000 employees, $400 million revenues
Other setting(s):
1999