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In mid-1994, the prospect of a new Korean war loomed suddenly large on the political horizon. The precipitating factor: the strong possibility that North Korea was developing nuclear weaponry and the insistence of the US and South Korea that such a program was unacceptable. After years of negotiations, the possibility had now emerged of United Nations sanctions against North Korea, as well as the prospect of a military response by the heavily-armed Communist regime. This case tells the story of the tension and ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear negotiations. Based on access to leading State Department officials, it raises unusual negotiations issues: how to deal with an antagonist about whom much key information is obscure, as well as how to handle a tripartite negotiation in which one party (the US) is far stronger than its partner (South Korea), but in which the weaker ally is on the front line of potential conflict. This case is part of a series about US military interventions and negotiations against a backdrop of military threats. All are useful for those interested in negotiations theory, diplomacy and the politics of military interventions. See also A ''Seamless'' Transition: United States and United Nations Operations in Somalia, 1992-1993 (C16-96-1324.0 and 1325.0); and The Gulf Crisis: Building a Coalition